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Preface
The Game Problem of Soft Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–22
J. Albus, A. Meystel, A. Chikrii, A. Belousov and A. Kozlov
Abstract
The game problem of pursuit of a controlled object, moving in horizontal plane,
by another moving object, moving in three-dimensional space, is treated here.
Therewith the horizontal plane stands for a state constraint for the pursuer, who is
allowed to move only in the upper half-space. The dynamics of the players model
the motions of different-type objects in a medium, characterized by friction. The
goal of the pursuer is to achieve a simultaneous coincidence of geometric coordinates
and velocities at some finite instant.
The initial phase states are described and the sufficient conditions on parameters
of the conflict-controlled object are developed, for which the soft landing may be
performed in a finite time. To do this the game problem is reduced to the equivalent
problem of control. Then on the basis of in-depth analysis of the attainable set
the control of the pursuer in explicit (analytic) form is constructed, which furnish
solution to the original problem. On the initial stage velocities of the players are
levelled and on the concluding one the soft landing is performed. The duration
of each stage may be evaluated in advance. In conclusion some results of the soft
landing simulation are presented.
A Dual Approach to Compromise Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–32
J.M. Bilbao, E. Lebro´n, A. Jime´nez-Losada and S.H. Tijs
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the Tijs value as a solution concept for cost
allocation problems. Given a cost game c, we define its dual τ -value as τ (c∗), if the
dual game c∗ is quasi-balanced. Then we show that the dual τ -value coincides, for a
wide class of cost games, with the alternate cost avoided (ACA) allocation proposed
in the 1930’s by the Tennessee Valley Authority. It turns out that the center of the
imputation set, the egalitarian nonseparable contribution and the ACA allocation
are collinear.
Randomized Optimal Stopping Rules for a Class of
Stopping Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33–43
V. Domansky
Abstract
We consider games of stopping for Markov chain in the formulation introduced
by Dynkin (1969). Two players observe a Markov sequence and may stop it at any
stage. When the chain is stopped the game ends and Player 1 receives from Player
2 the sum depending on the player who stopped the chain and on its current state.
We describe solutions for a class of stopping games with a countable state space.
Payoffs are nonnegative and payoff is zero if Player 1 stops the chain but not Player
2. Estimations of value are obtained with use of randomized stopping times. The
qualitative characteristics of solutions are determined with the ”limiting” behavior
of payoffs.
The explicit solutions are given for the case when p(i, i+ 1) = 1.
Multi-objective Linear Production Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44–54
F.R. Ferna´ndez, M.A. Hinojosa and J. Puerto
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore the solutions concepts for multi-objective
linear production games. Several stability conditions can be defined since one can
have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework.
We present different solution concepts and explore the relationships among them.
These concepts generalize the classic ideas of solution for scalar games and can be
considered under different preference structures. The special features of the linear
production problem make possible to obtain rewards allocations of the core among
the players. These allocations are related with optimal solutions of special class of
scalar linear production games.
Tchebycheff Systems and Analysis of Games Versus Nature on the Unit
Square . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–70
A.Y. Golubin
Abstract
A class of antagonistic games in which a finite number of moment constraints
are imposed on the strategies of the second player (nature) is considered. A rela-
tionship between properties of this class and the part of moment theory concerning
Tchebycheff systems of functions is disclosed and studied. Using the notions of
moment theory, we introduce a condition of the Tchebycheff complement existence
that extends the definition of generalized convex game. Under the condition, the
finiteness of optimal strategies spectra is proved and the estimates for the numbers
of the spectrum points are found. A criterion for the existence of a Tchebycheff
complement for the game with power moment constraints is established in the form
of a factorization of the pay-off function derivative. A sufficient condition for the so-
lution uniqueness is obtained. The paper is finished with two examples illustrating
the results.
Simple Dynamics from Complex Behavior in Duopoly Pricing Games . .
71–79
S. Huang, K. Anderson and Y. Yang
Abstract
We study a class of dynamic pricing duopoly games that model the type of
environment in which e-commerce will be carried out in not so distant future. Under
Markov settings these games can be solved via backward induction. The solution
is found to display very complex patterns as a function of the discount factor,
due to bifurcation phenomena in the discrete map induced by backward induction.
However, it is possible to define an effective but simpler dynamics that retains the
optimality of the original game. We further show that this effective dynamics can
be sustained by steady self-confirming equilibria. Our results (1) set limits on what
learning algorithms based on Markov assumptions can achieve and (2) imply that
learning in this kind of game should not be focused on the exact reaction functions,
but rather on achieving optimal net present values with the realized time series of
prices.
A Study to Obtain a Realistic Game Solution in an
Air Combat Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80–89
F. Imado and J. Shinar
Abstract
A method to obtain the optimal solution of a practical complex problem, for-
mulated as a zero-sum dynamic game is presented and applied to an example of an
air-to-air interception in a horizontal plane. The principle of the method, called ”
method of bounds”, is to start with a pair of suboptimal feedback strategies, de-
pending on some parameters, for both players. Next, by solving numerically a set
of one-sided optimal control problems for each player, against the set of parameters
of the opponent the optimal values of the parameters are found. If the difference
between the outcomes of the two parameter optimization problems is small, the
feedback strategies using the optimal parameters represent an approximation of the
saddle point strategies of the game. The application of the method for the selected
minimum time air-to-air interception example showed a very good accuracy.
Conflict and Co-operation in Fisheries:
A Game Theory Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90–106
M. Lindroos and V. Kaitala
Abstract
We review multi-agent game theoretic models of international fisheries manage-
ment. A special interest is in analysing under what circumstances international
conflicts may arise and how can these conflicts be avoided and solved. The central
model framework that we use is cooperative game theory. We use this framework to
study the possibilities, conditions and stability of cooperation in high seas fisheries.
The cooperative game theory framework is constructed using the traditional differ-
ential games in fisheries economics. This general theoretical framework has been
applied to the cases of Norwegian spring-spawning herring and Northern Atlantic
bluefin tuna where discrete time and age-structured population dynamics model as
a basis for cooperative game models is used. We show that external and internal
stability of cooperation depends on several factors including technological efficiency
and harvesting costs. Identifying these factors is crucial for any successful coopera-
tive arrangement that would be negotiated for fisheries in the future. Furthermore,
the problem of uncertainty may be avoided by simple adaptive modifications to the
full cooperation strategy. This result is extremely important in the case of spring-
spawning herring since natural variations in the stock have been high. Overall, we
stress the importance of sustainable international cooperation of marine fish stocks.
Guidance Law Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107–114
S. Le Me´nec
Abstract
We are developping an Artificial Intelligence application to switch missile guid-
ance laws. This software simulates a pursuer using Proportional Navigation except
when the state of the game is reaching the barrier of the differential game, then
Expert System rules commute the guidance law to optimal guidance law to keep
the state of the game in the capture zone. This study is part of work dedicated to
Artificial Intelligence Methods for Missile Guidance and Control Systems which is
an EUCLID Contrat (No 99/EF 15.02/006).
Non–symmetric Solution of an Arbitration Game . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–120
V.V. Mazalov and A.A. Zabelin
Abstract
The following arbitration scheme is considered. Two players L andM interpreted
as Labour and Management, respectively, are negotiating on a wage rate. Player
L makes an offer x, and player M – an offer y. We shall assume that x and y are
arbitrary real numbers. If x ≤ y, there is no conflict, and the players agree on a
payoff equal to e.g. (x+ y)/2. If otherwise x > y, the parties call in the arbitrator
(A) to settle the dispute. In this paper we consider the final-offer arbitration scheme.
We shall consider a case where the arbitrator’s solution is random and concentrates
in two points a1 and a2.
Nash Equilibria Refinements for Multistage and
Repeated Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121–130
L.A. Petrosjan
Abstract
Multistage game G with simultanous games Γ(·) played on each stage is con-
sidered. The definition of outcome, path in tree-graph and history are introduced.
The new class of Nash Solutions based on the possibilities of punishment for the
deviation on first stages of G are defined. It is shown that the outcomes under
these solutions dominate the classical subgame perfect Nash outcomes. For infinite
multistage games G the regularization procedure is introduced which enables to
construct a strong Nash Equilibrium (coalition-proof) in such class of games.
Discretization, Nonlinear and Bilevel Programming in Pursuit–evasion
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131–146
T. Raivio and H. Ehtamo
Abstract
In this paper we deal with approaches to solve pursuit-evasion games by dis-
cretization, nonlinear programming and bilevel programming. We first explore dif-
ferent discretization approaches for ordinary optimal control problems. Then, we
describe a method to decompose the solution of pursuit-evasion games into optimal
control problems that can be solved using discretization and nonlinear programming.
Yet another approach is to discretize the game itself at the outset and construct a
feasible direction bilevel programming method that makes use of the special struc-
ture of the problem. We discuss the performance of the discretization approach in
the light of numerical examples, and present some applications.
Random Assignment and Uncertain Employment in Optimal Stopping of
Markov Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147–157
D. Ramsey and K. Szajowski
Abstract
A mathematical model of competitive stopping of a Markov chain is considered.
Two decision makers observe goods or applicants for a post sequentially. Each object
is characterized by some random variable. The aim of the players is to obtain the
most profitable object. The rules of game are as follows. An object can be accepted
only at the moment of its appearance. At each moment n one object is presented.
When both players want to accept the same object, then some rule assigning priority
of acceptance to one of the players is applied. Any accepted object is available with
some given probability. If such an object is not available, it is lost to both players
forever. The solution of such games is found by solving a system of nested Bellman
Equations. An example related to the secretary problem is given.
Optimal Stopping Games by Equal-weight Players for Poisson-arriving
Offers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158–169
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
Players I and II must make a decision to accept (A) or reject (R) an offered
job at each offer presentation. The offers arrive during time interval [0, T ] as a
Poisson process with rate λ. The offered jobs have random sizes being i.i.d. random
variables from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Whenever an offer with size x arrives
it is presented to both players simultaneously, and players must choose either A or
R. If the player’s choice-pair is A–R or R–A then the player who chooses A gets x
dropping out from the game thereafter, and the other player continues his (or her)
one-person game. If the choice-pair is A–A the the lottery is used to the effect that
A–R or R–A is enforced to the players with equal probability 12 . If the choice-pair is
R–R, then the current sample x is rejected and the game passes on the time when
a new job arrives next. Players who can not accept any offer until time T gets a
reward of zero. Each player aims to maximize his expected reward. We shall also
discuss about the bilateral–move version of the game.
Intermediation and the Poor Property Rights Protection . . . . . 170–174
D. Shaposhnik
Abstract
The paper develops a model of equilibrium on a particular market. Producers
and buyers are assumed to have no market power and to act as price-takers. There-
fore market is characterized by standard neoclassical demand and supply functions.
There are also n agents called middlemen who buy the commodity from producers
and sell it to the customers. So the initial market is separated into the wholesale
market and retail one, where the middlemen act one against the other. The case
when the middlemen undertake no costs connected with transportation, storing,
maintenance of shops, etc. is considered. The imperfect case with incomplete prop-
erty rights protection is investigated. The environment is taken to be characterized
by a parameter , which has the following sense. If someone is ready to spend the
amount A to force middleman i out of business, this middleman must pay A in order
to protect herself completely from the aggression. The symmetric Nash-equilibrium
is computed in this game.
Asymptotics for Singularly Perturbed Differential Games . . . . 175–196
N.N. Subbotina
Abstract
Singularly perturbed differential games with ”fast” and ”slow” motions and the
Bolza type payoff functionals are considered. Sufficient conditions are obtained to
converge the value functions of the games to the value function of the limit unper-
turbed game as the singularity parameter tends to zero. The concept of minimax
solutions to Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations and reduction technique approach are
developed to the nonautonomous, nonlinear problems. The constructed limit un-
perturbed games are defined in phase subspace of ”slow” motions under augmented
admissible controls of players.
